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In gratitude to Professor Zoltán Abádi-Nagy, ardent 
promoter o f  academic and cultural relations between 
Hungary and the United States o f  America.
The dismemberment of the Kingdom of Hungary after the First 
World War and consequently the Treaty of Trianon came as a shock fór 
the Hungarians. The treaty, which the Allies dictated and nőt negotiated 
with Hungary, was considered unjust, and its revision became a number 
one concem fór interwar Hungárián society regardless of eláss and status.
Mainly defined by a set of traditional images of America as the land 
of freedom, democracy and fair play and the image of the United States as 
arbiter mundi, and at the same time based on significant political, 
historical and ideological tenets (i.e. the question of dismemberment, 
Wilson and the Fourteen Points, US boundary proposals fór Hungary at 
the Paris Peace conference, American refusal to sign the Treaty of 
Trianon) Hungarians fed high expectations toward the United States 
relatíve to the revision of the Treaty of Trianon. Such Hungárián 
revisionist aspirations toward the United States, however, were nőt well- 
founded. Although somé expressions of individual American sympathies 
with Hungary’s cause fumished somé hope, offícial America did nőt 
intend to support the revision of the Treaty of Trianon. The offícial 
American standpoint in relation to Hungary in generál and treaty revision 
in particular can only be fully understood against a backdrop of the
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generál trends of American foreign policy in the interwar period and, 
within this framework, American policy toward Hungary. Such an 
analysis, combined with the demonstration of the attitűdé of the 
respective American govemmental bodies (including the State 
Department and the representatives of the US in Hungary in the American 
Legation in Budapest) regarding Hungárián revisionism conclusively 
demonstrates the lack of official interest in the Hungárián cause.
The fundamental guiding principle of American foreign policy 
toward Europe following the First World War was the Monroe doctrine, 
the century-old American policy of political isolation. By the Senate’s 
rejection of the Paris peace treaties and the reluctance to jóin the League 
of Nations the United States refused to undertake the political and 
military commitment to and the responsibility fór enforcing the peace. 
American unwillingness to endorse international causes, as manifested, 
fór example, by the debate about the World Court, the Locarno treaty or 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, indicated that she decidedly pursued the policy 
of non-entanglement, primarily with European issues. While the US 
refused to accept international commitments and obligations, political 
isolationism frorn Europe was somewhat reinterpreted in accordance with 
ever-increasing American interests in the European economy. What tied 
American economic interests to Europe were mainly the interrelated 
questions of debts, war-time and peace time loans and the claims, 
reparations, occupation costs as well as other economic privileges arising 
from the separate peace treaties the US signed with European countries. 
On the other hand, the opportunity fór US investments and prospective 
trade relations with that part of the world alsó underlined US economic 
interests.1 The key to European economic recovery and prosperity, thus to
1 Fór more on international relations after the war see Selig Adler, The Uncertain Giant: 
1921-1941. American Foreign Policy Between the Wars (New York: MacMillan, 
1995), 70-92; Peter H. Buckingham, International Normalcy. The Open Door Peace 
with the Former Central Powers, 1921-1929 (Willmington, Delaware: Scholarly 
Resources, Inc., 1983), 1-34; 124-153; Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion. 
American Political, Cultural, and Economic Relations with Europe, 1919-1933 
(Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1984). See alsó Melvin Small, Democracy and 
Diplomacy. The Impact o f  Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789-1994 
(London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) and Ármin Rappaport, ed., 
Essays in American Diplomacy (New York: MacMillan, 1967). Hereafter respectively 
cited as Adler, The Uncertain Giant; Buckingham, International Normalcy; 
Costigliola, Awkward Dominion and Small, Democracy and Diplomacy.
428
the success of American business, as the Young and Dawes Plans 
demonstrate, was, of course, Germany. Therefore, the US devoted special 
attention to her. At the same time, other Central European countries, 
among them Hungary, alsó became a possible target of American 
investors. American economic interest largely defined the relative 
significance of Hungary in terms of American foreign policy in the 
region.
Although Hungarians liked to believe otherwise, the Kingdom of 
Hungary was nőt among the most important American spheres of interest. 
What is more, Budapest and Hungary had alsó been labeled as places 
(relatively) “unimportant” by the State Department. Still, as part of 
Central Europe, and more importantly as a politically and economically 
rather instable State, Hungary continuously held the attention of the 
Division of Western European Affairs of the State Department. The 
Western European Desk was concemed about Hungárián affairs, and 
explicitly stated its desire to récéivé continuous information regarding 
Hungárián politics, govemment, economic life, military and social 
issues.2 3
After the armistice in November 1918 the State of belligerency had 
to be terminated and peace had to be signed between the US and 
Hungary. Consequently, the generál terms and conditions upon which the 
diplomatic, political and economic relations of the two countries were to 
rest during the interwar period were defined by the separate peace treaty 
between Hungary and the United States, signed on August 29, 1921. The 
specific stipulations of the treaty, setting the framework fór the relations 
of Hungary and the United States, reflect the uneven natúré of the 
relationship between the two countries, with the US dictating the 
conditions.4 While Hungary had to guarantee all the rights, privileges and
2 WilliamR. Castle, Jr. to George A. Gordon. October20, 1926. The WilliamR. Castle, 
Jr. Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa. Hereafter cited 
as The William R. Castle, Jr. Papers. Access to the Castle Papers was made possible 
fór me by Dr. Tibor Glant. With regard to important consular transfers Castle informs 
Gordon, secretary in the American Legation in Budapest, about the transfer of a high 
ranking consular officer, Mr. Gale to Budapest, who, as Castle suspects, will “make a 
terrible fuss about being sent to a piacé as unimportant as Budapest.”
3 William R. Castle, Jr. to Charles B. Curtis, December 6, 1923. The William R. Castle, 
Jr. Papers.4
See Charles Evans Hughes to Ulysses Grant-Smith, July 9, 1921: “[...] the peace 
resolution is a clear expression of the Congress that more rights, advantages, and
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advantages to the US to which she was entitled under the Treaty of 
Trianon, the US explicitly renounced all the responsibilities and 
obligations possibly arising from it, especially in relation to stipulations 
specified in the Covenant of the League of Nations.
Article I
Hungary undertakes to accord to the United States, and the United States 
shall have and enjoy, all the rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or 
advantages specified in the [...] Joint Resolution of the Congress of the 
United States of July 2, 1921, including all the rights and advantages 
stipulated fór the benefit of the United States in the Treaty of Trianon 
which the United States shall fully enjoy notwithstanding the fact that 
such Treaty has nőt been ratifiedby the United States. [...]
Article II
With view to defining more particularly the obligation of Hungary under 
the foregoing Article with respect to certain provision in the Treaty of 
Trianon, it is understood and agreed between the High Contracting 
Parties:
(1) That the rights and advantages stipulated in that Treaty fór the benefit 
of the United States, which it is intended the United States shall have and 
enjoy, are those defined in Parts V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII and XIV.
(2) That the United States shall nőt be bound by the provisions of Part I 
of that Treaty, nor by any provisions of that Treaty including those 
mentioned in paragraph (1) of this Article, which relate to the Covenant 
of the League of Nations, nor shall the United States be bound by any 
action taken by the League of Nations, or by the Council, or by the 
Assembly thereof, unless the United States shall expressly give its assent 
to such action.
(3) That the United States assumes no obligations under or with respect 
to the provisions of Part II, Part III, Part IV and Part XIII of that Treaty.5
Within this larger framework, following the treaty of peace and, of 
course, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, other 
treaties previously made by the US with Hungary had to be renegotiated, 
with special emphasis on those which guaranteed US trade and business
interests must be secured to the USA, and that our Government will nőt conclude any 
treaty that does nőt secure those rights, etc.” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations 
o f  the United States. 1921. Vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1936), 250.
5 Treaty between the United States of America and Hungary, Signed at Budapest, 
August 29, 1921. Quoted in Small, Democracy and Diplomacy, 257.
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interests. Besides such instruments as the copyright and extradition 
treaties, “there remained still the following: commerce and navigation, 
property and consular jurisdiction, agreement conceming tobacco, 
consular convention, naturalization, trade marks and arbitration, etc.”6 78
The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Hungary, 
signed on June 24, 1925, fór example, was one result of suchn
considerations and negotiations.
The three chief points of interest to the government of the US in 
connection with Hungary, as was confidentially stated by George A. 
Gordon, a secretary of the American Legation in Budapest, were (1) 
legitimism and the King question, (2) the fiscal policy of the Hungárián 
government and the economic consolidation in Hungary, and (3) Trianono
and Hungárián revisionism. While the legitimist threat was ruled out 
after Emperor Charles’ second unsuccessful attempt to return to the 
throne, economic questions and Hungárián revisionism remained the 
major focuses of attention fór official America. The consolidation of the 
Hungárián economy, a budget standing on firm grounds and the solvency 
of Hungárián banks became the prerequisite of the sympathies of American 
business circles and the American government.9 The intemational loan to 
Hungary fór reconstruction, known as the League of Nations loan, to 
which the US government alsó consented in 1924, served the very aim to 
help Hungary get back on her feet.10 It indirectly secured American 
economic interests (including the payment of debts and claims) and 
rendered prospective investments (fór example in shipping, agriculture, 
forestry and railways) safer. A memorandum sent to the State Department 
by Ulysses Grant-Smith, the US commissioner to Hungary from 1919 to
6 Horace Dorsey Newson to William R. Castle, Jr., November, 29, 1922. The William R. 
Castle, Jr. Papers.7
Fór more detail see the 69th Congress lst Session (March 17-April 5, 1926) Records 
o f the Senate Vol. LXVII. Part 6. 1926. RG46 NARA.
8 George A. Gordon to Secretary of State, June 3, 1927. M710 Roll 1 and 2 RG59, 
NARA.9
See the conversation between Regent Miklós Horthy and William R. Castle, July 23, 
1920 and Castle’s account on his conversation with Hungárián Fináncé Minister on 
November 2, 1922. William R. Castle, Jr. Diaries. Houghton Library, Harvard 
University, Cambridge, MA. This source was made available to me by Dr. Tibor 
Glant of Debrecen University.
10 The American Jeremiah Smith, commissioner of the League of Nations was sent to 
Hungary to provide assistance and help in the consolidation of Hungárián economy.
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1922, summarized the situation as follows: until serious post-war 
problems of Central Europe and Hungary were
solved to somé appreciable degree the commerce of the West must suffer 
the delet[e]rious effects of one portion of the body being deceased and in 
a stage of high fever. [...] It is evident, therefore, that the United States 
has a vitai interest in desiring an early solution of these great problems 
and the consequent pacification of so large and populous an area of the 
earth’s surface.11
That American economic interest deftned American action in 
Hungary is alsó demonstrated by the following incident. In the winter of 
1926 the Tripartite Claims Commission dealing with claims arising under 
Article 231 of the Treaty of Trianon set the prewar rate of exchange 
concerning the payment of debts according to the average rate during the 
month preceding the outbreak of the war. In case of the US, as of 
November 1917, this rate amounted to 9.4 cents per crown, which 
Hungary found too high. The Hungárián govemment, via the Hungárián 
Legation in Washington and the American Legation in Budapest, tried to 
bargain fór a reduction or, as George A. Gordon of the American 
Legation in Budapest remarked somewhat furiously, it “solicit[ed] an out 
and out gift” This Hungárián demand, however, did nőt find favorable 
reception in the State Department. On the one hand, the Commission was 
an independent body which governments could nőt influence. On the 
other hand, by that time the State Departmentjudged the conditions of the 
Hungárián economy and budget good enough to pay that rate. Other 
favors such as the postponement of the payment of other unpaid claims 
(fór example reparations fór prisoners of war) due to the US had already 
been granted to Hungary previously. Therefore, there seemed to be no 
legitimate reason fór the Hungárián Government “to plead the necessity 
of poverty” and economic instability or try to classify legitimate 
American claims as “treaty charges,” a State Department memorandum 
argued. Such bargaining on the part of the Hungárián govemment was 
labeled as “evasive haggling,” and the argument pút forth by the 
Hungárián govemment as to why such a favor fór them was necessary
11 Ulysses Grant-Smith to the State Department, December 13, 1920. Roll 1 and 2 M710 
RG 59, NARA.
1 2 George A. Gordon to William R. Castle, Jr., November 27, 1926. The William R. 
Castle, Jr. Papers.
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was designated as “preposterous.” The memorandum continued to pass a 
devastatingjudgment conceming the Hungárián attitűdé:
[The Hungárián] Government in generál seems to be somewhat in the 
habit of regarding the United States as the purveyor of all good things, 
including an unceasing flow of foreign loans, and the quality of its 
gratitude is certainly nőt devoid of a lively sense of favors to come; it 
therefore behooves it nőt to confine its responsiveness to lip service.* 13
Gordon’s opinion may stand out as rather extreme, bút a generál 
conclusion may be drawn that while the US was willing to cooperate with 
and assist Hungary fór the sake of Hungary’ s economic consolidation, it 
was nőt altruism or America’s sense of responsibility that made the US do 
so. Her down-to earth and well-calculated interest explained her economic 
policy toward Hungary.
The third major issue of interest fór the US government was 
Hungárián revisionism. The questions of economic stability and the 
revision of the Treaty of Trianon were interestingly linked, inasmuch as 
the harsh peace terms and the subsequent political, economic and social 
burdens which Trianon imposed on Hungary were argued to have created 
a considerable threat to the economic viability of the country, and alsó to 
the economic stability of the whole of Central Europe. On the grounds of 
economic, political and morál considerations American politicians frorn 
official circles often gave voice to their belief that the treaty was a 
mistaken one, and that its economic, financial and political stipulations 
were too harsh. Such views, however, never affected the official position 
of the United States on the revision of the Treaty of Trianon. Official US 
retained its uncompromisingly consistent policy of non-entanglement in 
this question.
William R. Castle, Jr., chief of the Division of Western European 
Affairs at the Department of State, was in charge of Hungárián matters. 
Since he was actively involved in dealing with Hungárián issues, his 
papers and official correspondence offer reliable grounds fór reviewing 
official American views about treaty revision. Several of his comments in 
his diary suggest that he deeply understood the “bitterness” of Hungarians 
over the peace treaty.14 When discussing the difficulties of the Hungárián
n George A. Gordon to William R. Castle, Jr., November 27, 1926. The William R.
Castle, Jr. Papers.
See fór example the July 27, 1921 entry in William R. Castle, Jr. Diaries.14
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economy, the failure of the crops, and Hungary’s difficulties in 1921 and 
1922 in stabilizing its currency, he did nőt view the large payments the 
Reparation Commission tried to force on Hungary as timely. He wamed 
of the possibility of an immediate and disastrous economic and financial 
crash in Hungary:
Personally, I have no sympathy whatever fór reparation demands on 
Hungary. The people who want the money are the Czechs, Yugoslavs 
and Roumanians who should be satisfied with the vast Hungárián 
territories they have acquired. I think there can be no doubt in this case 
that what they all three want is the utter ruin of Hungary, to absorb the 
country altogether, which would mean trouble fór generations to come.15
Castle was aware that the peace treaties “created impossible nations 
with impossible boundaries and the ruling groups in these new nations are 
playing havoc with their own States as well as bringing on an international 
crisis.”16 Still, in his offtcial capacity as undersecretary of State of the 
Western European Desk he never promoted changes in the postwar 
European system. He consistently warned his colleagues in the American 
Legation in Budapest to avoid any connection with Hungárián revisionist 
propaganda, popular, unofftcial, or semi-offtcial.
At the time, as the immediate effect of the Kossuth Pilgrimage in 
1928, the Hungárián patriotic organizations in the US were preparing to 
carry out pro-Hungarian propaganda, “[t]his, of course, include[ing] 
propaganda fór the revision of the treaty.” They were alsó preparing to 
organize a Hungárián congress in Buffalo. Neither of the ideas was 
welcomed by the State Department. The Department assumed that the 
Buffalo congress expected its proceedings and speeches to be “widely 
reported in all the papers [...] and thereby” it hoped to “influence the 
American govemment and [...] demand the revision of the treaty.”17 The 
issue was even more delicate since somé representatives of the Hungárián 
government were alsó expected to attend the congress. Therefore, Castle 
sent the following instructions to the American minister in Budapest:
[Y]ou could well find the opportunity to say to somé of your friends in 
the Hungárián Government that the American Government is nőt at all
15 November 22, 1922. WilliamR. Castle, Jr. Diaries.
16 July 27, 1921. WilliamR. Castle, Jr. Diaries.
17 William R. Castle, Jr. to Joshua Butler Wright, March 8, 1929. The William R. Castle, 
Jr. Papers.
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keen about this kind of business. When foreigners become naturalized, 
we feel that their efforts should be devoted to improving things in the 
country of their adoption. This does nőt at all mean that we expect them 
to lose interest in the problems of the country from which they come, bút 
merely that they should nőt publicly devote themselves to propaganda, 
which in this case is nőt only pro-Hungarian, bút anti-Czech, Roumanian 
and Yugoslav and is, therefore, directly against govemments with which 
we are on friendly terms. [...] [I]t would create a storm of abuse [...] nőt 
favorable to Hungary and that besides making trouble in this country, it 
would undoubtedly do serious harm to the Hungárián cause. Anything 
that Hungary does to spread pro-Hungarian ideas, such as sending over 
exchange students and exchange professors to the universities or people 
who will talk or write in a reasonable way, we naturally have no 
objection to whatever, bút I can only reiterate that these patriotic 
organizations can and do make a lót of trouble.18
So, even the least possible association with revisionist propaganda 
was viewed by offtcial America as most unacceptable and dangerous.19 20
Similarly, the State Department and the American Legation in 
Budapest handled the dedication of the statue to General Harry Hill 
Bandholtz in August 1936 with caution. Bandholtz was the American 
member of the Inter-Allied Military Mission to Budapest in 1919. He 
enjoyed great popularity and the respect of the Hungarians, because he 
prevented the Rumanian army from looting the Royal Hungárián Museum 
in Budapest during the Rumanian occupation of Budapest in the fali of 
1919. To commemorate the activities of the generál, the American 
Hungárián community raised funds fór the statue. Hungarians viewed the 
Bandholtz statue as a living proof of the Rumanian aggression as well as
1 R
William R. Castle, Jr. to Joshua Butler Wright, March 8, 1929. The William R. Castle,
Jr. Papers.
19 Evén the indirect danger of revisionist “junketing” prompted the immediate action of 
the State Department, as was the case when Countess Bethlen wished to deliver a 
lecture in the US under the title “The Habsburgs, Mussolini and other European 
public characters.” “If Countess Bethlen should come over and give somé rather 
scandalous lectures about European personalities, I have no doubt that she would 
draw an audience of sorts, bút it would be distinctly disagreeable fór us and 
disagreeable fór Hungary. Personally,” Castle observed, “I don’t like to see the wife 
of the Prime Minister come to this country fór a more or less junketing expedition and 
if  I were a really rich mán, I should offer to pay her to stay away. That would alsó be 
because of my liking fór Hungary.” William R. Castle, Jr. to Nicholas Roosevelt, June 
20, 1931. The William R. Castle, Jr. Papers.
20 The Royal Hungárián Museum is known as the Hungárián National Museum today.
435
Symbol of the devastation of Trianon and American sympathy fór the 
Hungárián cause.21 John F. Montgomery, then American minister to 
Budapest, was nőt only invited to be present at the unveiling, bút was 
asked to speak as well. Reference to Trianon and covert revisionist 
appeals to the American nation were expected at the ceremony, which 
took piacé on July 4.22 23Therefore, the State Department took immediate 
steps to instruct the US representatives in the American Legation “to be 
careful nőt to take an active part in the ceremony and under no 
circumstances should [any of them] make any remarks.” Minister 
Montgomery shared the concerns of the State Department and alsó 
wished to refrain from participation at the unveiling. He could only 
excuse himself from being present by way of an official leave of absence 
signed by the secretary of State which instructed him to be in Washington 
before June 15th, well before the ceremony.24 The unveiling of the 
Bandholtz statue in Budapest, as was foreseen, set Hungárián anti- 
Trianon propaganda intő mohon, when after the erection of the statue the 
American Hungárián daily, Szabadság, launched a campaign to collect 
signatures in support of the revision of the treaty. Official US stayed out 
of that project as well.
Official representatives of the US to Hungary during the interwar 
period displayed the same attitűdé toward revision. Of course, the 
American ministers to Hungary had to comply with the official American 
approach. Bút was there a personal side to all this? Did any of them, even 
tacitly, support Hungárián revisionism? Did their personal relations to the
21 Fór more detail on the political significance of the statue see János Pótó, Az 
emlékeztetés helyei. Emlékművek és politika (Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 2003).
22 The unveiling of the Bandholtz statue finally took piacé on August 23, 1919.
23 Secretary of State Cordell Hull to John F. Montgomery, March 23, 1936. Papers 
Relating to the Foreign Relations o f  the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1936. Vol. 
2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954), 335. Hereafter cited as
FRUS. 1936.
24 Montgomery to Hull, March 27, 1936; Hull to Montgomery, March 31, 1936. FRUS. 
1936, 336. Hungarians were utterly disappointed by the absence of the American 
minister. To avoid offending Hungárián sensibilities and bad impressions about the 
American Legation, one of the charges represented the American Legation at the 
unveiling ceremony. Fór further detail alsó see Tibor Frank, ed., Roosevelt követe 
Budapesten. John F. Montgomery bizalmas politikai beszélgetései, 1934-1941 
(Budapest: Corvina, 2002), 50-53. Hereafter cited as Frank, ed., Roosevelt követe 
Budapesten.
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country and its leaders influence their official views? The record shows a 
rangé of reactions.
During the interwar period five American diplomats served as 
senior American representatives in Budapest: Ulysses Grant-Smith 
(1919-1922), Theodore Brentano (1922-1927), Joshua Butler Wright 
(1927-1931), Nicholas Roosevelt (1931-1933) and John Flournoy 
Montgomery (1933-1941). Ulysses Grant-Smith was the unofficial 
diplomatic representative of the US in Hungary from December 1919 to 
January 1922, and served as chargé d ’affaires pro tempore until May 
1922.25 He was sent to the region to safeguard American interests, and 
had the responsibility to establish the foundations of the official contacts 
between the two countries.26 27*The difficulties of his task defined nőt only 
his official, bút alsó his reserved and often negatively biased personal 
relations to the country and her people. The “habitual, unconscious 
exaggeration practiced by all the people” and their “tendency to speak in 
figurative phrases, and [...] consequently misunderstand and discount one 
another’s statements” made him a stem critic of postwar Hungary. 
During most of his stay in Hungary, until August 29, 1921, no official 
diplomatic relations existed between the US and Hungary. This set the 
framework fór his actions and explained why his activities were guided 
by extraordinary caution with respect to any kind of political utterance 
relative to Hungárián problems after the war, among them the Treaty of 
Trianon. His opinion and the instructions he received from the State 
Department, fór example, in connection with the Conference of Allied
25 The National Cyclopedia o f  American Biography. Current Volume F. 1939-1942 
(New York: James T. White & Co., 1942), 403.
26 “While exercising the utmost caution nőt to commit yourself and this govemment to 
preference fór one or the other of the many political groups which seeks to control the 
govemment of Hungary, you will be expected tactfully to encourage such 
constructive movements among the Hungarians as would appear to lead toward the 
firmer establishment of a representative govemment.” Secretary of State to the 
Ulysses Grant-Smith, December 10, 1919. FRUS. 1919. Vol.l and 2 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1934), 410-411. Hereafter cited as FRUS. 1919.
Vol. 1 and 2.
27 Ulysses Grant-Smith to Secretary of State, May 17, 1920. Roll 1 and 2, M710 RG 59, 
NARA.
oo
Secretary of State to the Ulysses Grant-Smith, December 10, 1919. FRUS. 1919. Vol.l 
and 2, 410-411. Ulysses-Grant Smith served during the term of three secretaries of 
State, namely Róbert Lansing, Bainbridge Colby and Charles Evans Hughes.
437
Diplomatic Representatives in Budapest, shows how undesirable he 
considered even the least direct connection with issues relating, in any 
way, to Hungárián politics. Grant-Smith was of the opinion “that any 
participation of the American representative in Hungary in the conference 
should be in response to a request from the British, French and Italian 
Governments and that it should be strictly informál.” “It appears to me,” 
says Grant-Smith,
that the best American policy would be to avoid becoming implicated in 
any demarche which may be taken in this regard; and I am more than 
ever impressed by the wisdom of the telegraphic instructions sent me 
under date of November 23, last, [...] that I should take no part, even as 
an observer, in the conferences of diplomatic representatives of the 
Principled Allied powers at this Capital. The longer I follow the 
development of affairs in Central and Eastem Europe the more do I 
become convinced of the wisdom of a policy of detachment and a 
minimum interference on our part in the regulation of the numberless 
complicated questions which continue to arise as a result of the war. The 
tendency would ever become more marked, on the part of all concemed, 
to shift the responsibility fór failures to our shoulders, as well as the 
expense. The presence of foreign communities in the United States 
makes our country peculiarly susceptible to alien propaganda, and we 
should shortly find domestic problems overshadowed by issues far 
removed from our shores, and nőt infrequently inimical to our national
• 30ínterests.
Grant-Smith knew that although Hungary accepted the loss of her 
territories temporarily, she would nőt submit forever to the conditions 
brought about by the peace treaty.29 *31 He had strong opinions about 
Hungary’s new frontiers:
The Magyars, just as the Serbs, Roumanians, and Czechs, if  victorious, 
would have Iáid claim to vast territories as due them. It is their natúré, it 
is their habit of mind to make exaggerated claims. [...] Consequently, 
had the new boundaries of Hungary been made to include all the 
contiguous Magyar populations which lie at present in Czechoslovakia, 
Roumania, Yugoslavia, the Hungarians would have immediately claimed
29Grant-Smith to Secretary of State, September 29, 1920. Roll 1 and 2, M710 RG59, 
NARA.
Ulysses Grant-Smith to Secretary of State, December 24, 1920. Roll 1 and 2, M710 
RG 59, NARA.
TI
Ulysses Grant-Smith to Secretary of State, May 31, 1920. Roll 1 and 2, M710 RG 59, 
NARA.
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something beyond. As it is presented, however, the League of Nations 
might very well and, in justice, ought to hand back those populations to 
Hungary. This might keep them quiet fór a time and would afford them 
no legitimate grounds to carry on a propaganda fór regaining lost
• • 32temtones.
In August 1921 the US and Hungary signed a separate peace treaty 
ending the State of belligerency. In consequence, offtcial diplomatic 
relations between the two countries were established as well. The first 
offtcial representative of the US to Hungary after the war was Theodore 
Brentano.
Brentano was a retired judge when he entered the diplomatic service 
and was appointed minister to Hungary in 1921. He served in Budapest 
between 1922 and 1927. His diplomatic activities in Budapest were met 
with somé criticism in the State Department, since Castle was nőt fully 
satisfied with his work.32 4 35Unfortunately, only a small amount of State 
Department documents are available regarding Theodore Brentano’s 
stand on the revision of the Trianon peace treaty. His monthly 
memoranda to the secretary of State on revisionist propaganda in Hungary 
and abroad, however, contained no personal comments. Thus, in the 
absence of personal remarks his opinion is impossible to analyze. His 
successor, Joshua Butler Wright was the exact opposite.
Having served at various important diplomatic posts both in Europe 
(Brussels, London, The Hague) and in Latin America (Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil and Santiago, Chile), Wright was appointed envoy extraordinary 
and minister plenipotentiary to Hungary in 1927. His diaries contain 
somé objective comments regarding Hungárián questions and treaty
32 Ulysses Grant-Smith to Secretary of State, May 17, 1920. Roll 1 and 2, M710 RG 59, 
NARA.
33 The National Cyclopedia o f  American Biography. Current Volume C (New York:
James T. White & Co., 1930), 487-488.
34 Rumors were spread that Brentano was drunk more often than sober. “There has been 
a good deal of agitation in the Department to replace Judge Brentano by a Service 
Minister. There are innumerable stories that he is drunk most of the time and if  these 
stories are true he is, of course, a peculiarly unfit representative of this dry country. 
There have alsó been rumors of personal misbehavior with somé Jewish dancer from 
the opera, bút in these stories I take no stock whatever.” Castle to Charles B. Curtis,
May 6, 1925. The WilliamR. Castle, Jr. Papers.
35 The National Cyclopedia o f  American Biography. Volume XXX  (New York: James T. 
White & Co., 1943), 196-197.
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revision, including the one according to which the League of Nations was 
nőt paying enough attention to the local questions in this [Central Europe] 
part of the world.36 His official correspondence with the State Department 
on the other hand is more indicative of his critical stand on Hungárián 
issues. The fact that Wright kept a shrewd eye on Hungárián affairs, 
especially on revisionist propaganda is best demonstrated by his comment 
regarding the Hungárián exaggeration and overestimation of the successes 
of the Rothermere campaign.37 38 The American Legation in Hungary 
continuously informed the State Department about issues relating to 
Rothermere’s campaign, as well as about the press coverage it received 
both in Hungary and abroad, with special respect to the successor States. 
State Department documents make it clear that official American circles 
deemed Rothermere’s eccentric activities unfortunate and harmful, 
encouraging false hopes. Joshua Butler Wright’s somewhat harsh 
judgment conceming Hungárián tendencies to overestimate the significance 
of the Rothermere’s campaign sheds light on official American attitudes 
toward revisionism. Considering the extent to which the Hungarians 
believed that their difficulties interested the rest of the world, “[o]ne gains 
the impression,” Wright said,
that these people are convinced that Hungary is an important factor in 
the generál European policy of England and other great Powers; this is 
bred from their intense national spirit and lőve of country, which, I
36 Joshua Butler Wright on October 9, 1927. Box 3. Series IV. Diaries. Joshua Butler 
Wright Papers. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton,
NJ.
37 Lord Harold Sidney Harmsworth Rothermere’s all-out anti-Trianon press campaign in 
the London Daily Mail energized Hungárián revisionism from abroad. He made the 
Hungárián question the focus of attention in Britain, as well as in the United States. 
Although Rothermere’s efforts did nőt yield any political results, he became the hero 
of the day. He won over many Americans and Hungarian-Americans after his 
unofficial visit to the United States in the winter of 1927-1928. While official 
America ignored him, Hungárián- American communities welcomed the Englishman 
as the savior of Hungary. He became popular with “the mán of the Street and of the 
press.” His eloquent, enthusiastic and highly emotional argumentation stressed the 
responsibility of the United States in creating an unjust peace and appealed to the 
American liberal and democratic tradition. He had great influence on his audience by 
reciting popular slogans such as, fór example, that “Trianon was bőm in the US” and 
made them béliévé that “Hungary’s future will be decided in the United States.” 
Amerikai Magyar Népszava, April 28, 1928.
38 Wright to Secretary of State, July 31, 1927. Roll lor 2, M710 RG 59, NARA.
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believe, is unsurpassed anywhere else in the world. It is therefore to be 
regretted that they appear to be blind to the ill-effects of this untimely
• • 39agitation.
Wright’s comment went to the heart of the matter: Hungárián 
expectations of offtcial American support were nőt well-founded.
Nicholas Roosevelt’s personal papers and correspondence with the 
State Department reveal the same approach. Nicholas Roosevelt, diplomát 
and journalist, served at diplomatic posts in Paris and Madrid, and was a 
captain in the military in Francé after the US entered the First World War. 
After the armistice President Wilson appointed him his aide in Paris, then 
member to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. Later he was 
commissioned to Vienna in 1919-1920 as member of the American fteld 
mission.* 40 Therefore, when in 1930 he received an appointment as 
minister to Hungary, he arrived in a region which was familiar to him. 
While in offtce Roosevelt concentrated mostly on the economic and 
ftnancial life of both Hungary and Central Europe.41 He never really liked 
the piacé. His condescending attitűdé toward “semi-feudal” Hungary, the 
behavior of Hungarians and their conduct in life are duly illustrated by 
Roosevelt’s memoirs, A Front Row Seat42 As Roosevelt was regarded 
“the best informed American in Central Europe,”43 a formerjoumalist and 
a diplomát who had widespread contacts with the American business and 
political circles, Hungarians expected much from him: “Mr. Roosevelt is 
nőt only a diplomát bút alsó a journalist who writes striking articles fór 
the best American reviews and dailies. His sympathy therefore nőt only
tq
Wright to Secretary of State, September 30, 1927. Roll land 2, M710 RG 59, NARA.
40 Roosevelt was in Budapest in March 1919 when the Hungárián Soviet Republic
(Tanácsköztársaság) was declared.
41 The National Cyclopedia o f  American Biography. Current Volume F. 1939-1942
(New York: James T. White & Co., 1942), 324-325.
42 Fór further details see Nicholas Roosevelt, A Front Row Seat. A Sparklingly Personal 
Narrative o f  the History-Making Events in Which Mr. Roosevelt Has Participated, 
and the Notable Figures He Has Known, Especially the Roosevelt Family (Norman, 
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953), 186-205. His retrospective 
recollections may have become somewhat more critical of contemporary Hungary 
than they actually were in 1930-1933. On the other hand his critical approach to 
Hungárián issues and cautious policy are alsó underlined by his correspondence with
the State Department.
43 The National Cyclopedia o f  American Biography. Current Volume F. 1939-1942 
(New York: James T. White & Co., 1942), 324.
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means that he communicates the favorable impressions gained in Hungary 
in an official quality bút he gives even greater publicity to the same.” 4 In 
an interview Roosevelt was asked what Hungary could expect from the 
United States? He gave a very diplomatic answer. While avoiding the 
disappointing answer of a straightforward “nőt much,” he cordially 
explained that until America got more familiar with Hungary, she could 
nőt expect much from the US. Therefore, she needed bigger and wider 
publicity in the US to make ties and spiritual relations between the two 
countries stronger. Fór this, he said in several interviews, as a journalist, 
he would willingly work: “Being nőt only in the service bút alsó a 
journalist, I will use the publicity of the American papers in the interest of 
Hungary. One does read more and more about your country now in our 
papers, bút I will alsó contribute with my modest pen to increase the 
publicity on Hungary.”4 5 46
Like his predecessors, Roosevelt viewed Hungárián attempts at the 
revision of the Treaty of Trianon critically and with caution. Roosevelt 
was concerned about the Hungárián military, despite the fact that the 
Treaty of Trianon introduced strict limits on its size. He was very much 
aware that Hungary had nőt accepted the peace treaties “except through 
force.” He knew that Hungarians looked forward to regaining their lost 
territories; therefore, he wrote, the suspected “development of Hungary’s 
military establishment could materially affect the peace of Europe.” 6 The 
essence of his opinion concerning revisionism was briefly bút explicitly 
summed up in the introduction which Roosevelt wrote to Horthy’s 
memoirs in 1956. The program, he says, “to try to restore to Hungary the
44 8 órai újság, September 28, 1933 in Box 5. Series I. Correspondence, Nicholas 
Roosevelt Papers, Syracuse University Library, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY.
Hereafter cited as Nicholas Roosevelt Papers.
45 8 órai újság, September 28, 1933. Box 5. Series I. Correspondence, Nicholas 
Roosevelt Papers. See alsó “Mit remélhet Magyarország Amerikától?” Pesti Hírlap, 
October 12, 1930 in Box 3. Series VII. Correspondence, Nicholas Roosevelt Papers. 
See alsó “Október [...] az új amerikai követ. Beszélgetés a New York Times 
szerkesztőségében Nicholas Roosevelttel,” Az Est, October 12, 1930 in Box 3, Series 
VII, Nicholas Roosevelt Papers.', Imre Déri, “Roosevelt követ beszél terveiről s 
Magyarországról,” Amer/la/' Magyar Népszava, September 27, 1930 in Box 3. Series 
VII, Nicholas Roosevelt Papers', Emil Lengyel, “Old Budapest Goes American,” New 
York Héráid Tribüné, March 31, 1931, 15 in Box 3. Series VII, Nicholas Roosevelt
Papers.
46 Nicholas Roosevelt to Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley, January 14, 1931. The
William R. Castle, Jr. Papers.
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boundaries it had had before the Habsburg [E]mpire broke up” was “a 
policy” which “however commendable to Magyars, ran counter to the 
nationalist aspirations and fears of non-Magyars, and was doomed to 
failure.”47 48His successor, John Flournoy Montgomery, alsó had a strong 
opinion about Hungárián revisionism.
Unlike Nicholas Roosevelt, Montgomery became a true admirer of 
Hungary during his mission in Budapest. This affection, however, did nőt 
positively bias his views conceming revisionism. Montgomery, a 
manufacturer and businessman with extensive interests in the milk 
condensing and food industry in the US, served as minister to Budapest 
between 1933 and 1941. His personal papers and correspondence reveal 
how much he got to like Horthy’s Hungary. Indulging in the pompous and 
often ceremonious life of Hungary, he kept close relations with the 
members of the aristocracy, representatives of other foreign posts in 
Budapest and, of course, with prominent members of Hungárián political 
life. His views sometimes reflected the rather limited scope of his 
Hungárián social and political acquaintances. That notwithstanding, 
Montgomery sensed how powerful and dangerous a force Trianon was, 
and how it united all the layers of Hungárián society irrespective of eláss 
and social standing.49 As mentioned, Montgomery did nőt want to 
participate in the unveiling ceremony of the Bandholtz statue.50 Despite 
his favorable attitűdé toward Horthy’s Hungary, and his sometime more 
favorable judgment of things Hungárián, he developed a fairly critical 
opinion of the Hungárián attitűdé toward revisionism and the policies 
devised to achieve this goal. Although Montgomery did nőt consider the
47 The draft of Roosevelt’s introduction to the book attached to Nicholas Roosevelt to 
Róbert Speller, the publisher of Horthy’s memoirs, April 25, 1956. In Box 4. Series I. 
Nicholas Roosevelt Papers. See alsó Miklós Horthy, Memoirs (New York: Róbert
Speller & Sons, 1957).
48 The National Cyclopedia o f  American Biography. Current Volume D (New York:
James T. White & Co., 1934), 410-411.
49 Frank, ed., Roosevelt követe Budapesten, 11-65. See alsó Montgomery’s comments 
on golf, traveling, cuisine, viticulture, social life in Hungary in Box 1, Budapest 
Diplomatic Corps Exchanges, 1933-1937, The John F. Montgomery Papers. MS 353. 
Sterling Memóriái Library, Yale University. Hereafter cited as The John F. 
Montgomery Papers.
50 On the Bandholtz statue alsó see Box 4, Vol. VII. Personal Correspondence, 1933-37, 
Part I, The John F. Montgomery Papers.
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Habsburgh Empire a “political monstrosity”51 and understood the grief of 
the Hungarians over its dismemberment, he did nőt allow himself to be 
misled by Hungárián revisionist aspirations. He grew even more critical 
of Hungárián revisionism when Hungary sought to restore her former 
boundaries by force within the framework of the ever-strengthening 
Germán alliance.52 And while in his Hungary, The Unwilling Satellite 
Montgomery readily tried to savé Hungary’s reputation and depict her 
ultimate accession to the Axis powers as one of force and “unwilling” 
expediency, at the same time he passed rather ominous comments 
concerning revisionism and its dangers:
The revisionism I found in Hungary was a curious myth rather than a 
clear program. National disasters are just as conducive to psychological 
derangements as national triumphs. The main symptom in both cases is 
the growth of legends. In Hungary, people spoke with religious fervor of 
the restoration of the thousand-year-old realm, quite oblivious to the fact 
that in King Stephen’s time, Hungary did nőt have the frontiers which 
she lost in 1919. [...] As time went on and I gained the confidence of my 
Magyar friends, I discovered that many responsible Magyars were by no 
means in favor of a revisionist policy. On the contrary, they considered it 
a serious handicap, because it had become a national obsession. [...]
They alsó knew that revisionism was a dangerous toy and that Hungary 
was utterly unprepared fór war. [...] To the politicians, revisionism was 
a godsend, bút more responsible mén thought it dangerous.53
Throughout the interwar period the US strictly adhered to the policy 
of (political) non-entanglement. Providing support fór the revision of the 
Treaty of Trianon was never a viable option despite Hungary’s 
conviction, hope and illusions to the contrary. It was a well-known fact 
that the US did nőt become a member of the League of Nations, nor did 
she ratify its Covenant. Hungarians alsó attached much hope to the fact
51 Montgomery to Róbert D. Coe, December 4, 1939. Box 3, Foreign Service Personnel 
Exchanges, 1938-1939, Part I. Vol. 5. The John F. Montgomery Papers: “Personally I 
am nőt of the opinion that the Austrian-Hungarian Empire was a political monstrosity.
Everything I have leamt since I have been here convinces me to the contrary.”
52 Messerschmidt to Montgomery, November 20, 1934 and March 5, 1936, Box 2, Foreign 
Service Personnel Exchange, 1933-37, Part 1. Vol. 3, The John F. Montgomery 
Papers. See alsó Montgomery’s correspondence with the State Department. Roll #1
M1206 RG59,NARA.
53 John Floumoy Montgomery, Hungary. The Unwilling Satellite (New York: The 
Devin-Adair Company, 1947), 52-55. See alsó Frank, ed., Roosevelt követe 
Budapesten, 48-49.
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that following a long congressional debate in 1928 the US became a 
signatory to the Kellogg-Briand Pact: “The great importance of this 
intemational document,” says the Budapesti Hírlap,
is nőt because of its elimination of war- fór the possibility of war still 
exists-but the fact that the Government of the United States, which has 
hitherto stood aloof from European politics, considers that the moment 
has come to lead Europe, nőt merely financially, bút by applying the 
fresh and untainted Anglo-Saxon standard of morals to the corrupted 
political atmosphere of the old world.54
Overestimating the signiftcance of the pact with regard to Hungary, 
the article concluded that “America should take the golden pen and with it 
bring about order in Europe through treaty revision. In that case there 
would be no necessity of war. Without treaty revision peace will remain a 
vision.”55 The Kellogg-Briand Pact was meant to become a powerful non- 
aggression treaty. Yet, by nőt assuming military and political 
responsibility under collective security, the US turnéd the pact intő a 
somewhat ineffective multilateral treaty outlawing war. It did nőt become 
an effective means of conflict resolution.
In conclusion, Hungárián revisionist expectations toward the US 
were built on false hopes and illusions. America’s relations to Hungary in 
generál and treaty revision in particular were defined by the official 
American policy of political isolation toward Europe. The Western 
European Desk of the Department of State, and its head, William R. 
Castle, Jr., as well as the official American representatives of the US to 
Hungary consistently represented such a policy.
54 Wright’s Memorandum on Hungárián Affairs in August to Secretary of State. 
September 8, 1928. Roll 10 M708, RG 59 NARA.
55 Wright’s Memorandum on Hungárián Affairs in August to Secretary of State. 
September 8, 1928. Roll 10 M708, RG 59 NARA.
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